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UNILATERAL FORGIVENESS AND THE TASK OF RECONCILIATION 
 
ABSTRACT.  Although forgiveness is often taken to bear a close connection to the value of 
reconciliation, there is a good deal of scepticism about its role in situations where there is no 
consensus on the moral complexion of the past and no admission of guilt on the part of the 
perpetrator.  This scepticism is typically rooted in the claims that forgiveness without 
perpetrator acknowledgement (i) aggravates the risk of recidivism; (ii) yields a substandard 
and morally compromised form of political accommodation; and (iii) comes across as 
patronizing and offensive to the recipient, thereby causing further alienation.  In this article, 
my aim is to show, firstly, that none of these arguments is decisive and, secondly, that 
forgiveness is a suitable object of political concern in the absence of cross-community 
consensus on the rights and wrongs of a conflict.  In this way, I aim to demonstrate that 
forgiveness deserves to be taken seriously as a means to civic reconciliation in a broader 
range of situations than many have allowed. 
 
KEY WORDS.  Forgiveness, reconciliation, repentance, moral disagreement   
 
 
One of the familiar challenges facing post-conflict societies is to find an effective means of 
promoting peace and reconciliation.  In the aftermath of periods of civil war and ethnic 
conflict, it is clearly important to try to renew the bonds of trust and co-operation that are 
needed for a well-functioning civil society.  To address this challenge, one option that is 
sometimes recommended is the promotion of a ‘civil culture’ of forgiveness.  Especially in 
the wake of the South African experience, there is growing support for the view that 
forgiveness can play a valuable role in the public realm as a means of repairing damaged or 
broken political relationships (see Digeser 2001; Shriver 1995; Tutu 2000). 
However, this view is complicated by the dynamics that typically prevail following 
periods of ethnic conflict and political violence.  Particularly in societies which have been 
fractured along sectarian or racial lines, such as Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia, 
there tend to be competing narratives about the past and competing accounts of the rights and 
wrongs of the conflict, with the result that there is a reluctance on the part of those who are 
 2 
seen by one side or the other as perpetrators to face up to their guilt and make amends.  
Although this doesn’t necessarily mean that forgiveness should be excluded from such 
situations, it does raise at least two kinds of question about its suitability as a reconciliatory 
strategy. 
The first kind of question arises from the perspective of the individual victim who is 
contemplating the possibility of forgiveness.  From this standpoint, the fact of moral 
disagreement is apt to reveal itself in the reluctance of the alleged perpetrator to acknowledge 
any guilt or to make amends.  Due to their competing assessments of the past, the victim may 
have a lively sense of injustice and injury and yet the perpetrator may deny any imputation of 
wrongdoing.  As such, forgiveness – if it is possible at all – is apt to take the form of a 
unilateral initiative on the part of the victim which is unprompted by any evidence of 
perpetrator acknowledgement or repentance, and this raises the question of whether such 
forgiveness can be effective as a means of renewing civic trust and co-operation.  Can so-
called ‘unilateral’ forgiveness succeed in promoting civic reconciliation?1    
The second kind of question arises from the perspective of a state seeking to promote a 
‘civic culture’ of forgiveness.  Although forgiveness is first and foremost an interpersonal 
response, it may nonetheless feature as part of a broader institutional strategy for dealing with 
the past.  As a means of promoting peace and reconciliation, a state might encourage its 
citizens to forgive one another for past transgressions.  In this context, the fact of moral 
disagreement may complicate matters by making it much harder to determine the nature and 
                                                        
1
 Forgiveness is said to be ‘unilateral’ if it is granted independently of – and prior to – any 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing on the part of the recipient.  See, for instance, Govier (2002), p. 62.  Some 
philosophers tend to use the term ‘unconditional forgiveness’ to mean much the same thing.  However, I prefer 
to avoid this phrase because it encourages the mistaken thought that the only form of conditionality that might 
be relevant to the justification of forgiveness is the wrongdoer’s attitude towards the offence.  It is one of the 
points of this paper that there are ‘forward-looking’ conditions that bear on the justification of forgiveness 
which aren’t tied to perpetrator acknowledgement or repentance. 
For some general discussions of the ethical status of unilateral forgiveness, see Bennett (2003b), Garrard 
and McNaughton (2003), Griswold (2007), Haber (1991), Holmgren (1993), Pettigrove (2004) and Watkins 
(2009).   
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value of such a strategy.  Faced with situations where there is no cross-community agreement 
on who are the ‘victims’ in a conflict and who are the ‘perpetrators’, what is involved in 
promoting a civic culture of forgiveness, and is it consistent with values such as liberal 
neutrality and non-partisanship? 
In what follows, I propose to discuss both types of question in light of what I shall call 
the Repentance Thesis, the view that: 
(1) Forgiveness can only promote a worthwhile and sustainable form of civic 
reconciliation if there is at least a minimal degree of repentance on the part of recipient. 
 
Many of those who discuss these questions – including those who otherwise take a strongly 
pro-forgiveness view – insist that forgiveness will only succeed as a reconciliatory strategy if 
there is a sincere and remorseful admission of guilt on the part of the perpetrator.  Trudy 
Govier, for instance, asserts that ‘[a]cknowledgement of the wrongs of the past is critical in 
any politically sustainable reconciliation that features forgiveness’ (Govier 2002, p. 145) and 
Desmond Tutu claims that ‘if the process of forgiveness and healing is to happen and to 
succeed, ultimately acknowledgement by the culprit is almost indispensable’ (Tutu 2000, p. 
218; see also Amstutz 2004, pp. 185-6). 
My own view, by contrast, is that this emphasis on perpetrator acknowledgement is 
overstated.  Without denying that factors such as perpetrator acknowledgement and 
repentance can be a help, part of my aim in this paper is to show that forgiveness can still 
contribute to the task of civic reconciliation in the absence of a shared account of the rights 
and wrongs of the past.  To this end, I devote the earlier parts of my article to rebutting some 
of the arguments which are normally enlisted in support of the Repentance Thesis before 
going on to show that (liberal) states can justifiably seek to cultivate a civic culture of 
forgiveness in morally divided societies.  In this way, I hope to show that forgiveness – at 
both the individual and the institutional level – deserves to be taken much more seriously as a 
reconciliatory strategy than many have allowed.   
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Forgiveness and reconciliation: some definitions 
Forgiveness and reconciliation are both complex and contested concepts.  Especially in the 
civic realm, there are plenty of different accounts of their meaning and significance.  In the 
case of reconciliation, probably the most common line of analysis proceeds from the idea of a 
political relationship.  In her important and nuanced treatment of the concept, Colleen 
Murphy, for instance, starts from the claim that ‘political reconciliation broadly refers to the 
process of rebuilding political relationships’ (Murphy 2010, p. 8; see also Radzik 2009, pp. 
80-9). 
Of course, as Murphy is the first to admit, this style of analysis needs to refined and 
developed in order to mesh with the complexities of the subject-matter.  For one thing, 
reconciliation doesn’t necessarily involve the restoration of the status quo ante.  In many 
situations in which reconciliation is discussed, there may not have been any meaningful 
political relationships in the first place or else the relationships may have been characterized 
by violence, oppression and injustice.  Insofar as reconciliation is understood relationally, it 
therefore seems more plausible to understand it in terms of either the rebuilding or the 
building anew of healthy political relationships following a period of conflict, enmity or 
estrangement.
2
 
But this raises the further question of what constitutes a healthy political relationship.  
How should we understand the nature of the relationships that orientate the task of 
reconciliation?  Not surprisingly, perhaps, there are various answers to this question which 
reflect differing views both about the kinds of relationship that characterize an ideal political 
community and the kinds of relationship that constitute feasible policy-goals in the aftermath 
of conflict or mass violence.   
                                                        
2
 Here I echo Govier (2008), p. 229.  
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At the more ‘pragmatic’ end of the spectrum is an answer which stresses the idea of a 
modus vivendi.
3
  This is often taken to constitute a ‘thin’ or ‘minimal’ conception of 
reconciliation since it is defined primarily in terms of outward behaviour rather than inner 
thought and feeling.
4
  A modus vivendi is achieved when the different factions in a conflict 
stop fighting for purely strategic, self-interested reasons.  It is consistent with a modus 
vivendi that the factions maintain the sectarian, ‘them-and-us’ mentality that fuelled the 
original conflict.  It is consistent, too, with a modus vivendi that the factions are prepared to 
resume hostilities as soon as strategic calculations support doing so.         
A somewhat richer conception of healthy political relationships is framed in terms of 
the idea of social trust.  Govier, who develops this account, characterizes trust as the 
‘confident expectation that other people in the society (even strangers) will act in a decent 
and unthreatening way most of the time’ (Govier 2008, p. 235).  As Govier points out, social 
trust is particularly important in the aftermath of conflict since without it the different 
factions will be unable to work together effectively to further the peace process, develop 
stable civic institutions and promote economic development.  Indeed Govier rightly stresses 
that ‘[s]ocial trust is basic to the operation of society’ (Govier 2008, p. 235).  Healthy 
political relationships, Govier suggests, are trusting relationships.  Accordingly, she defines 
reconciliation as the process of building (or rebuilding) the degree of trust needed ‘for 
sufficient, sustainable co-operation’ (Govier 2002, p. 144). 
Beyond this, there is a still richer conception of reconciliation which draws upon some 
of the institutional constraints of political liberalism.  It is an apparent concomitant of 
Govier’s trust-based account that political reconciliation could be achieved in a society 
characterized by fundamental political inequalities.  Two people in a hierarchical, feudal 
society could, in principle, forge a trust-based relationship inasmuch as they could be 
                                                        
3
 For an influential specification of the concept of a modus vivendi, see Rawls (1993), p. 147. 
4
 The distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ conceptions of reconciliation can be found, for example, in 
Govier (2002), pp. 141-5, and Crocker (2000), pp. 107-108.  
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confident that they would perform their allotted civic roles without engaging in violence.  To 
those who favour a more value-laden conception of reconciliation, this conceptual possibility 
needs to be ruled out.  Those who embrace what might be termed the liberal solidarity model 
insist that healthy political relationships presuppose, among other things, the right kind of 
institutional scaffolding.  Darrel Moellendorf, for example, suggests that political 
reconciliation presupposes ‘juridical equality and a constitutional democratic legal 
framework’ (Moellendorf 2007, pp. 207-8).  He thinks that healthy political relationships (in 
the sense relevant to reconciliation) cannot exist in a society where some people are treated as 
second-class citizens and denied a political voice and basic civil rights.  This is not to say that 
he thinks the right kind of institutional order is sufficient for political reconciliation. On the 
liberal solidarity model, there are attitudinal – as well as institutional – dimensions of 
reconciliation.   Apart from a legal structure which adequately recognizes the value of 
political equality, Moellendorf stresses that the people involved must have the right kind of 
attitude towards the institutional order and towards one another.  They must see the order, not 
necessarily as ideal in all respects, but at least as crossing a minimum threshold of 
acceptability, and they must see one another as political equals who are the source of valid 
political claims.
5
 
There are plenty of other accounts of reconciliation, too.  Desmond Tutu, for example, 
tends to characterize reconciliation in terms of social harmony, friendliness and ubuntu, by 
which he means, roughly, an awareness of our common humanity and interdependence (Tutu 
2000, p. 35).  Nir Eisikovits emphasizes the relevance of sympathizing – the process whereby 
we imaginatively project ourselves into the circumstances in which others find themselves 
(Eiskovits 2010, p. 10).  For present purposes, I don’t propose to suggest that any one of 
these accounts is uniquely correct.  To my mind, different proposals highlight different social 
                                                        
5
 See Moellendorf (2007), p. 208.  Very similar accounts of political reconciliation can be found in 
Gutmann and Thompson (2000), Bennett (2003a) and Osiel (1999).  
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and moral goods which may figure in a political relationship, some of which may be 
combinable, and some of which may have greater significance in some contexts than others.   
Nonetheless, it is useful, for the sake of clarity, to have some kind of working definition 
in mind.  Since the arguments which motivate the Repentance Thesis presuppose a 
conception of reconciliation which goes beyond a modus vivendi, and since I don’t wish to 
rebut the Repentance Thesis by simply redefining the terms of the debate, I plan to adopt an 
account which combines elements of the trust-based and liberal solidarity models.  As an 
admittedly incomplete and abridged account, I propose to understand the task of political 
reconciliation as the task of building political relationships in the aftermath of a period of 
conflict, enmity or estrangement, where the relationships that are sought are characterized by 
non-violence, social trust and liberal solidarity, and are embedded within an institutional 
order which adequately reflects the values of democracy and equal citizenship. 
What about forgiveness?  How should this be understood?  Probably the most familiar 
style of analysis focuses on the emotional stance which a victim bears to a perpetrator.  There 
is a widespread tendency to characterize forgiveness in terms of the overcoming of the 
resentment that is often triggered on receipt of an unjustifiable and inexcusable injury.
6
  
However, most of those who favour this style of analysis recognize that not every case of 
overcoming resentment qualifies as genuine forgiveness.  Someone who puts to one side this 
emotion because they have forgotten about the initial injury isn’t forgiving, nor, for that 
matter, is the person who stops feeling resentful because they no longer view the original 
injury as blameworthy.  To distinguish forgiveness from related phenomena, it is therefore 
necessary to add some extra qualifications to the basic emphasis on emotional change. 
One such qualification concerns the role of belief within the forgiveness process.  It 
seems to be characteristic of those who forgive that they overcome their resentment whilst 
                                                        
6
 The locus classicus of this kind of account is Butler (1958), sermons VIII and IX.  The most 
philosophically developed version is Griswold (2007).  Other notable examples include Murphy (1988), Haber 
(1991), Roberts (1995) and Novitz (1998). 
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holding on to a clear conviction that they were unjustifiably and inexcusably injured.  It is the 
retention of this ‘cognitive ingredient’ in forgiveness that helps to distinguish it from other 
responses to wrongdoing, such as forgetting, excusing, justifying, rationalizing and 
condoning. 
Another qualification concerns the motivation for these adjustments.  Forgiveness, as a 
conceptual matter, seems to be defined by a certain kind of focus on the perpetrator (see 
Hampton 1988, p. 36, and Allais 2008, pp. 43-4).  Someone who says ‘This resentment is bad 
for my blood pressure.  I must get rid of it!’ doesn’t seem to be forgiving, nor does the person 
who says ‘This resentment I feel for my unfaithful spouse is bad for the children.  I must get 
rid of it!’  What this suggests is that the emotional change which is at the heart of forgiveness 
cannot come about for wholly self-interested reasons, or for reasons that pertain exclusively 
to third-parties.  Instead it must be motivated by some normatively salient feature of the 
perpetrator, such as their past suffering, their status as a rational agent, or their moral growth.   
A further qualification concerns the range of psychological changes that are involved.  
Although the overcoming of resentment is normally seen to be important, it is by no means 
obvious that it is the only kind of adjustment that is relevant to forgiveness.  Those who 
manage to put to one side attitudes such as mistrust, bitterness and hatred all seem to be 
taking important strides towards forgiveness, as do those who cease to engage in censorious 
or sanctioning behaviour.  This seems to suggest that forgiveness involves a more complex 
and multi-faceted process than any reference to a singular emotion conveys.  To forgive 
someone – in very general terms – involves ‘drawing a line under the offence’, not in the 
sense of forgetting or excusing it, but in the sense of discounting it from one’s practical and 
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emotional orientation towards the perpetrator, putting to one side all of those attitudes and 
intentions which are founded on the belief that one has been wronged – not just resentment.7  
 
Arguments for the Repentance Thesis 
With these analytical points in mind, it becomes possible to come to a better understanding of 
the nature and rationale of the Repentance Thesis.  Strictly-speaking, this thesis only entails 
the negative claim that: 
(1a) Forgiveness without at least some minimal degree of repentance on the part of 
recipient cannot promote a worthwhile and sustainable form of reconciliation. 
 
It doesn’t entail the positive claim that: 
 
(1b) Forgiveness with perpetrator repentance will promote a worthwhile and sustainable 
form of reconciliation. 
 
However, most of those who accept the negative claim accept the positive claim too: they 
believe that there is an asymmetry between the political value of unilateral forgiveness and 
the political value of what might be termed bilateral forgiveness. 
 In consequence, one way of understanding the Repentance Thesis is by firstly asking 
how its positive counterpart should be understood.  Exactly how is bilateral forgiveness 
supposed to contribute to the task of reconciliation?    
Presumably part of the answer to this question relates to the ways in which the 
experience of victimization affects people’s thought and conduct.  It is all-too-common – and 
perhaps all-too-understandable – for those who have been the victim of inexcusable 
wrongdoing to feel emotions such as resentment, anger, hatred, mistrust and suspicion, and to 
                                                        
7
 On my definition, forgiveness in its fullest sense is undeniably a difficult stance to achieve.  However, 
implicit in the definition is a contrast between complete and incomplete forgiveness.  A person might be said to 
have shown forgiveness, albeit to an incomplete degree, if they have taken certain steps towards ‘drawing a line 
under the offence’, even if a residue of hostility remains. 
A further caveat: the attitudes and intentions that are founded on the belief that one has been wronged 
need not be the same as the attitudes and intentions that are founded on the belief that one has been harmed, 
even though the beliefs may relate to the very same incident.  Forgiveness, on my account, typically requires 
overcoming emotions such as resentment and anger but not emotions such as disappointment and regret. 
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engage in acts of revenge and retaliation.  Insofar as bilateral forgiveness entails the 
overcoming of these emotions and dispositions, then it removes a significant set of barriers 
on the road to political reconciliation. 
 However, there needs to be a certain sense of realism about what bilateral forgiveness 
can and can’t accomplish.  There are preconditions of liberal reconciliation which aren’t 
directly in the power of individual victims to satisfy.  If a victim inhabits a society in which 
some people are treated as second-class citizens, then bilateral forgiveness – by itself – is 
unlikely to rectify the situation.  More generally, victims cannot normally address the 
‘institutional’ preconditions of reconciliation, at least not directly; all they can directly 
address are their own attitudes and intentions in respect of their assailants.  But since these 
attitudes and intentions may have a significant bearing on the prevailing ethos of a post-
conflict society, this is not to minimize the role which bilateral forgiveness can play in the 
task of reconciliation.  Bilateral forgiveness, by itself, may not take the parties all the way to 
a state of complete reconciliation, but it does constitute an important step forward. 
 This point, moreover, has an important bearing on the interpretation of the negative 
claim (1a).  To the extent that exponents of the Repentance Thesis think that there is an 
asymmetry between unilateral and bilateral forgiveness, they cannot simply be pointing out 
that forgiveness without repentance cannot remove all of the barriers to complete 
reconciliation since this is equally true of forgiveness with repentance.  Their point instead 
must be the stronger one that unilateral forgiveness is a step backwards rather than a step 
forwards in terms of reconciliation.   
This interpretation of (1a) is borne out in the different arguments that motivate the 
Repentance Thesis.  One such argument, which I shall call the Recidivism Argument, focuses 
on the durability of the reconciliation which unilateral forgiveness achieves.  It is clearly an 
important part of the task of civic reconciliation in war-torn societies to achieve a lasting 
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cessation of hostilities.  As a necessary precondition of the ideal of liberal solidarity, it is 
imperative to ensure that there is no return to the lawlessness of the past.  One of the worries 
that is sometimes expressed about forgiveness without perpetrator acknowledgement is that it 
doesn’t achieve this because it doesn’t address the ongoing risk that those who are 
unrepentant about their past use of violence might be prone to use violence again.  Govier, 
for instance, remarks that ‘[f]orgiveness that remains purely unilateral has little potential in 
most political contexts where the failure to acknowledge means the wrongs of the past could 
be repeated’ (Govier 2002, p. 145). 
Another argument, which I shall call the Alienation Argument, focuses on the way in 
which forgiveness comes across to the unrepentant perpetrator.  There is a concern that 
unilateral forgiveness will backfire as a reconciliatory strategy because it will seem 
patronizing and offensive to those who believe they are guilty of nothing.  P. E. Digeser, for 
instance, notes that ‘forgiveness without a shared account of responsibility runs the risk of 
becoming an insult’ (Digeser 2001, p. 56).  To forgive someone for behaviour they think is 
justifiable, he argues, is to accuse them ‘backhandedly of doing wrong’ and to insinuate a 
moral assessment of the situation which they may resent (Digeser 2001, p. 56; see also 
Govier 2002, pp. 145-6). 
A further argument, which I shall call the Compromise Argument, concerns the quality 
of the reconciliation which unilateral forgiveness brings about.  Although reconciliation is 
normally taken to be a good thing, there is a suspicion that unilateral forgiveness will deliver, 
at best, a substandard and compromising form of political accommodation.  Christopher 
Bennett, for example, worries that unilateral forgiveness reveals a willingness to renew a 
relationship on just any terms, rather than on terms of liberal solidarity (Bennett 2003a).  He 
explains: 
You may offer gift-like forgiveness to one who has wronged you in your capacity as a private 
individual.  But if this also means that you no longer expect them to repudiate their action 
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and to express their repudiation through making amends, then you are putting the need to 
restore your relationship somehow or other above the need to restore it adequately.  You are 
practising the Art of Compromise (Bennett 2003a, p. 73).
8
  
 
Together these arguments support the stronger claim that unilateral forgiveness is a 
retrograde step in terms of reconciliation.  They seem to imply that unilateral forgiveness is 
counterproductive as a way of building healthy political relationships following a period of 
conflict, enmity or estrangement.  Of course this isn’t to say that this implication is right.  
Indeed, at this point, a broader methodological reservation might be entered: it might be 
suggested that the truth or falsity of the Repentance Thesis isn’t strictly-speaking a 
philosophical matter at all but instead depends on the psychological, sociological and, more 
generally, empirical data.  
At least in one respect, I don’t mean to deny this point.  I agree that the Repentance 
Thesis is an a posteriori claim about the causal link between one way of dealing with the past 
(forgiveness) and one kind of political condition (reconciliation).   As such, it cannot be 
divorced from empirical findings.  But, in my view, it cannot be divorced from broadly 
philosophical findings either.  As I shall endeavour to show in the next section, the arguments 
which underpin the Repentance Thesis seem to rest on a priori assumptions about – among 
other things – the kind of relationship it is possible to achieve with an unrepentant perpetrator 
and the analytic link that exists between the concepts of non-repentance and liability to 
recidivism.  By questioning these assumptions, I intend to undercut the appeal of the 
Repentance Thesis and to lend support to an altogether different account of the relation 
between forgiveness and reconciliation which is much more congenial to the role of 
forgiveness in post-conflict societies.   
 
Beyond the Repentance Thesis 
                                                        
8
 A similar worry about compromise is in evidence in Minow (1998), p. 16.  
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At this point, it’s useful to imagine a situation where one person’s sense of victimization isn’t 
mirrored by another person’s acceptance of wrongdoing.  To take a simple and schematic 
example, suppose that person A has been injured in a politically-motivated bomb attack 
orchestrated by person B, and imagine that, in the aftermath of the attack, A characterizes the 
bombing as an unjustifiable and inexcusable act of terrorism whereas B defends it as a 
legitimate measure undertaken in the service of a just cause.  In reflecting on the plausibility 
of the Repentance Thesis, it’s instructive to consider whether there is any way of filling out 
the details of the case such that forgiveness doesn’t succumb to the arguments just 
mentioned.  Can A forgive the unrepentant B without aggravating the risk of recidivism, 
alienating the recipient, or engaging in an unsatisfactory form of compromise? 
Consider, first, the Recidivism Argument.  Although there are slightly different ways of 
developing this argument, one familiar formulation emphasizes the positive value of the 
attitudes and intentions that are given up in the forgiveness process.
9
  There is a view that 
attitudes such as resentment, anger and mistrust can play a positive role in social life as a 
means of preventing further offences.  Joseph Butler, in his classic treatment of the subject, 
claims that ‘[m]en are plainly restrained from injuring their fellow-creatures out of fear of 
their resentment’ (Butler 1958, p. 131) and Nigel Biggar, in his critique of unilateral 
forgiveness, claims that the ‘punitive withholding of trust’ can be a stimulus towards moral 
growth and rehabilitation (Biggar 2008, p. 563).  On this line of interpretation, the reason 
why unilateral forgiveness does little to promote a lasting form of reconciliation is because it 
                                                        
9
 The other version of the argument emphasizes the message which forgiveness sends to the unrepentant 
wrongdoer.  This seems to be the line of thought that is uppermost in Griswold’s mind.  Although he recognizes 
that logically-speaking forgiveness isn’t the same as approval or condonation, he worries that this is how it will 
come across to those who are unrepentant.  As he explains (Griswold 2007, pp. 64-5): ‘[t]he victim may 
subjectively feel that she is not overlooking the wrong done; but if the forgiveness is unconditional...the 
offender is very likely to draw the conclusion that her wrongdoing has been condoned.’ 
I find this unconvincing, at least in many cases.  Indeed the force of the Alienation Argument depends 
precisely on the fact that unrepentant perpetrators generally don’t draw the conclusion that their conduct is being 
condoned: this is why they may find forgiveness insulting.    
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involves surrendering a valuable stance by which future wrongs might be prevented, thereby 
aggravating the risk of recidivism.   
Stated in this way, it becomes apparent why the argument isn’t normally taken to 
extend to cases where forgiveness is granted to a repentant perpetrator.  Bilateral forgiveness 
isn’t normally taken to aggravate the risk of recidivism because the repentant perpetrator isn’t 
seen as someone who requires the threat of resentment or anger in order to refrain from re-
offending.  Implicit in the argument is therefore an assumption about the relative worth of the 
attitudes that are given up in the forgiveness process.  It is because these attitudes are seen as 
necessary in cases where the offender is unrepentant but superfluous in cases where the 
offender is repentant that there is a perceived asymmetry between unilateral and bilateral 
forgiveness. 
But once this assumption is noted, the argument can be seen to rest on an 
oversimplification for – even if it is true that emotions such as resentment and anger can 
exercise a deterrent or reforming effect – there are ways in which a person can be unrepentant 
about their past conduct and yet be no more at risk of reoffending than their repentant 
counterpart.     
To see this, imagine, firstly, that person B no longer has the capacity to engage in 
political violence: perhaps age and infirmity have taken their toll, such that B no longer has 
the physical ability to mount bomb attacks, or perhaps B, though still young and healthy, 
lacks access to the resources or weaponry needed to mount further attacks. 
Imagine, too, that B no longer has the moral disposition to engage in political violence, 
perhaps because she believes the circumstances no longer warrant it.  This kind of possibility 
is all-too-easy to overlook for it is tempting to think that if someone is unrepentant about an 
earlier action, they must believe that is acceptable to repeat the action in the future, but this 
doesn’t follow.  It is perfectly coherent for a person to believe that it was permissible to 
 15 
perform an action, , at a time t1, but that it is impermissible to  at a later time t2.  In the 
present case, B might, for instance, hold that the political grievance that justified the initial 
bomb attack has been addressed, so that there is no longer any just cause for violence, or else 
B might believe that she is subject to a special obligation to refrain from using violence 
which has arisen post-t1, perhaps as a result of a promise or peace treaty. 
There are, in consequence, a whole host of cases where B can be unrepentant about the 
bomb attack and yet not be prone to repeat such an attack in the future, and this, in turn, 
implies that the there are a whole range of cases where A can forgive B without worrying too 
much about the risk of further violence.   
The more general point to stress here is that the concepts of non-repentance and 
liability to recidivism are logically distinct.  The former concerns a person’s attitude towards 
their past behaviour whereas the latter concerns their dispositions in respect of their future 
behaviour.  Those who espouse the Repentance Thesis sometimes move so quickly from the 
thought that someone is unrepentant to the thought that they pose an ongoing threat to the 
moral order that they give the impression of overlooking this point.  Their mistake, in this 
respect, seems to be as much conceptual as empirical.  
A related response, moreover, is available in relation to the Compromise Argument.  To 
see this, it is useful to consider in greater detail the nature and presuppositions of this 
argument.  At least on Bennett’s formulation, two assumptions seem to be paramount.  The 
first assumption is that it isn’t possible to achieve an ethos of liberal solidarity with someone 
who is unrepentant about their past misconduct.   Bennett asserts that ‘[i]n the absence of 
repentance and atonement the two sides remain, in an important sense, unreconciled’ 
(Bennett 2003a, p. 75).  Insofar as B remains stubbornly unrepentant about the bomb attack, 
then Bennett implies that A and B cannot forge a relationship based around principles of 
mutual respect and non-violence since B maintains that it is sometimes defensible to use 
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violence against A.  The best kind of relationship that A and B can hope for is a modus 
vivendi.   
The second assumption is that unilateral forgiveness does nothing to stimulate the 
required moral transformation.  Assuming for the sake of argument that liberal reconciliation 
does indeed presuppose repentance, the only way it is possible to be reconciled with someone 
who is initially defiant about their past misconduct is to get them to see the error of their 
ways.  Bennett insists that adopting a ‘hard line’ is essential here.  ‘True reconciliation’, he 
asserts, ‘can only be achieved through punishment’ (Bennett 2003a, p. 68).  A ‘forgiving 
approach’, he thinks, is no help in this regard because it does nothing to challenge, confront, 
or censure the perpetrator’s unreformed attitudes and beliefs.  If A were to forgive B, then A 
would be drawing a line under the bomb attack and would thereby be acquiescing to a 
relationship in which she is seen as unworthy of minimally decent (i.e. non-violent) 
treatment.  
Together these two points help to clarify the sense of compromise which is germane to 
the Compromise Argument.  In essence, Bennett’s argument draws on a distinction between 
‘more or less adequate civic relationships’, which, in turn, maps onto the distinction between 
the liberal solidarity model of reconciliation versus a modus vivendi (see Bennett 2003a, p. 
73).  Bennett’s worry about those who accept a policy of unilateral forgiveness is that they 
seem to resign themselves to the latter rather than taking the steps necessary to bring about 
the former.  Their compromise is the compromise of adopting a substandard form of political 
accommodation rather than doing what is needed to bring about a fairer, healthier one. 
However, once it is noted that a person can change their values over time without 
repenting them, then this argument, too, can be seen to rest on an oversimplification.  The 
crucial mistake comes in the initial assumption that a reconciliation based on shared liberal 
values is impossible with someone who is unrepentant about their past misconduct.  This 
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ignores the possibility that a person might be committed to liberal democratic values going 
into the future whilst insisting they were unsuited to the conditions of the past.  Imagine, for 
instance, that B says to A: ‘As I see it, at the time of the bombing, I was fighting against you 
and your community, and war is a specific moral condition with its own values and rules.  In 
war, actions that would otherwise be unjustifiable are justifiable and attitudes that would 
otherwise be inappropriate are appropriate.  Given this, I’m not going to repent the stance of 
hostility I adopted towards you at the time of the attack, but nor am I going to allow this 
stance to persist into the present.  From henceforth, I’m going to see you as a fellow citizen, 
who should not be subject to violence or non-democratic coercion.’ 
In this instance, B seems to be amenable to a form of reconciliation which goes beyond 
a modus vivendi.  Notwithstanding the lack of repentance, B is open to a political relationship 
which isn’t rooted in self-interest or expediency but is affirmed on moral grounds.  Were A to 
forgive B in such circumstances, there seems to be no question of A’s acquiescing to a modus 
vivendi or relationship in which she is seen as unworthy of minimally decent treatment since 
this is no longer how B sees her.   The relationship that would result from forgiveness would 
instead be characterized by a shared commitment to principles of mutual respect and non-
violence.  
This still leaves the Alienation Argument.  This argument focuses on the way in which 
forgiveness is received by the unrepentant perpetrator.  It suggests that the unrepentant 
perpetrator will take forgiveness as an insult because she won’t accept the negative moral 
assessment on which it is based.  Implicit in this argument, therefore, is the assumption that 
forgiveness gets communicated to the offender.  It is only if B is told that she is being 
forgiven that there is a risk that she will find the response patronizing or judgmental. 
One quick a priori reply to the argument, then, is to deny that forgiveness must take an 
articulated form.  It is perfectly possible on my analysis for A to forgive B without making 
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this fact publicly known.  However, even if forgiveness is articulated, there is a further a 
priori point which blunts the force of the argument.  It is an important part of the conceptual 
structure of forgiveness that it is undertaken for the right kind of reasons.  To forgive 
someone involves drawing a line under their conduct, not for self-interested reasons, but for 
reasons that are suitably focused on the recipient, such as respect for their rational status or 
concern for their well-being.  Insofar as B is aware of this, then, whilst she may not agree 
with the underlying assessment of her conduct, there is the possibility that she will welcome 
forgiveness as being undertaken for the best of motives.     
Of course, whether this possibility is realized in any given situation still depends on the 
contingencies of B’s personality.  There is always a risk that the ‘concern and respect’ aspect 
of forgiveness will get spoilt by the fact that it presupposes a negative judgment that B 
doesn’t accept.  But whether this happens depends, in turn, on the attitude that B takes 
towards the competing assessments of the past.   Although B doesn’t accept that the bomb 
attack was unjustifiable, she may take various attitudes towards A’s belief that it was, ranging 
from outright incomprehension and disdain through to respect and toleration.  If she veers 
towards the first kind of attitude, then she may respond negatively to forgiveness since her 
primary thought will be ‘What a cheek! I don’t need to be forgiven for anything!’  But if she 
veers towards the second kind of attitude, she may respond more favourably since she will 
acknowledge that serious-minded and reasonable people can have competing moral 
narratives about the past, including competing assessments of the bomb attack, such that 
expressions of compassion and respect should be welcomed irrespective of the broader moral 
narrative on which they are founded.    
There are, then, various permutations of the basic example where unilateral forgiveness 
doesn’t succumb to the kinds of objections that are normally canvassed: in these cases, A can 
forgive B without aggravating the risk of recidivism, delivering an unacceptable compromise, 
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or alienating the recipient.  To be clear, I am not claiming that every permutation will be like 
this: if B is still prone to violence and hostility, it’s hard to see that forgiveness will do much 
to promote the ideal of liberal solidarity, just as it’s hard to see that it will do much to 
promote the ideal of liberal solidarity if B is so uncomprehending towards A’s assessment of 
the past that any offer of forgiveness is taken as an insult.  But the important point to stress is 
that these cases don’t comprise the totality of permutations where B is unrepentant about the 
attack. 
Once this is noted, then it becomes apparent that the Repentance Thesis misconstrues 
the relation between forgiveness and reconciliation.  It places too much emphasis on the 
perpetrator’s attitude towards the past.  This is not to deny that repentance is an ethical good 
in its own right, nor is it to deny that it often goes hand-in-hand with those factors that are 
essential to a forgiveness-based reconciliation, but it is to deny that it is one of these factors 
in itself.  
This observation, moreover, paves the way for a more accurate account of the relation 
between forgiveness and reconciliation.  Insofar as there is a relevant form of conditionality, 
it is best stated, not in terms of (1), but in terms of the altogether different claim that, 
(2) Forgiveness can only promote a worthwhile and sustainable form of civic 
reconciliation if (i) the recipient isn’t liable to re-offend; (ii) is committed to liberal 
democratic values going into the future; and (iii) isn’t apt to take the insinuation of 
wrongdoing as an insult.  
 
Notice that this analysis puts most of the emphasis on the perpetrator’s attitude towards 
the future.   What matters to a sustainable forgiveness-based reconciliation, on this view, are 
the values and dispositions which the perpetrator brings to her subsequent relationships rather 
than the stance which she takes towards her previous conduct.        
Notice, too, that this analysis has an important bearing on the scope of forgiveness in 
post-conflict societies.  Although it substitutes one form of conditionality for another, it 
would be a mistake to infer from this that it is just as restrictive as the Repentance Thesis.  As 
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a contingent truth, the conditions set out in (2) tend to be more readily satisfied than the 
conditions satisfied in (1).  This can be illustrated anecdotally by an example relating to the 
conflict in Northern Ireland.  In many ways, Northern Ireland is a paradigmatic case study for 
my purposes since it is a society characterised by deep divisions about the past and ongoing 
debates about the rights and wrongs of the conflict.  The specific example that I want to 
mention relates to the IRA’s bomb attack on the Grand Hotel in Brighton in 1984, which 
killed five people and injured a further thirty-one.  In the period since the attack, the 
perpetrator, Patrick Magee, has defended the bombing as a justifiable response to the political 
circumstances of the time.  Although he has expressed regret for the loss of innocent life, he 
has refused to acknowledge wrongdoing or demonstrate repentance.  In an interview with the 
Daily Telegraph in 2009, for example, he stated: ‘I stand by my actions…I don’t understand 
repentance.  I think it has a religious meaning…I made a contribution, why would I ask 
forgiveness for that’ (Brighton bomber Patrick Magee defiant, 2009)? 
However, Magee, like many former paramilitaries, is a supporter of the peace process.  
He was released from prison in 1999 under the Good Friday Agreement only because he was 
no longer deemed at risk of committing further acts of violence.  At a number of speaker 
events, he has expressed his commitment to the values of mutual respect, tolerance and 
democratic inclusivity heralded by the Agreement (see Brighton bomber Patrick Magee 
defiant, 2009).  He has also condemned the ‘dissident’ republicans, who continue to espouse 
violence, on the grounds that there is an effective political voice for republicanism that was 
absent in the 1970s and 1980s (see Wilson 2000).  Although he doesn’t satisfy the conditions 
laid out in (1), he does therefore seem to satisfy the conditions laid out in (2). 
On my hypothesis – but not on the hypothesis captured by the Repentance Thesis – 
Magee is therefore someone with whom it is possible to achieve a worthwhile and sustainable 
forgiveness-based reconciliation.  Moreover, the subsequent facts seem to bear this out.  On 
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release from prison, Magee was forgiven by a number of those who were affected by the 
bombing.  Harvey Thomas, who was injured in the blast, saw it as his Christian duty to 
forgive (see Brighton bomb victim, 2001) and Jo Berry, whose father was killed in the attack, 
shared the platform with Magee at various events designed to promote peace and 
reconciliation, with the result that an unlikely friendship blossomed (see Berry 2009).  In 
these instances, in spite of Magee’s non-repentance, it’s hard to see that forgiveness had any 
of the negative consequences set out in the foregoing arguments: it didn’t aggravate the risk 
of recidivism since Magee no longer posed a risk of violence anyway; it didn’t elicit 
resentment or alienation since Magee was sufficiently respectful towards the variety of moral 
narratives not to take the insinuation of wrongdoing as an insult; and it didn’t lead to a 
limited modus vivendi since the resulting relationships seemed to be based on a shared 
commitment to building a peaceful and democratic Northern Ireland rather than on narrow 
sectional interest. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that it is easy – in any categorical sense – to get people 
to give up violence.  As the example of Northern Ireland makes abundantly clear, it can be 
exceptionally difficult to get people to surrender their arms and to commit to exclusively 
peaceful means.  But my conjecture is that it is even more difficult to secure peace with 
repentance than peace without it.  As Tutu puts it, ‘[i]t is perhaps the most difficult thing in 
the world’ for us to admit our wrongs (Tutu 2000, p. 217).  Although there are various 
reasons for this, one possible explanation lies in the interconnection between repentance and 
practical identity.  To repent our past behaviour may require us to disown part of our previous 
moral narrative, whereas to change our values going into the future is consistent with our 
maintaining the same narrative, but taking it in a new direction.  The former seems to be 
disruptive of our self-image in a way that the latter is not.     
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Promoting forgiveness: illiberal and partisan? 
So far, my argument has focused on reconciliation on the small-scale.  The specific examples 
that I have mentioned concern the quality of the civic relationships that exist between two 
people.  But clearly a state that invokes the ideal of civic reconciliation is going to have its 
eye on the bigger picture.  Particularly in the aftermath of civil war or mass violence, it may 
be concerned with the totality of civic relationships that exist within a community.  As such, 
it may be reluctant to leave the task of reconciliation to the initiative of private individuals for 
fear that this will deliver, at best, sporadic and patchy benefits.  Instead it may seek to find a 
more coordinated, institutional strategy of its own.   
In this context, my rejection of the Repentance Thesis is relevant.  It implies that a state 
shouldn’t exclude the role of forgiveness just because there is a dearth of perpetrator 
acknowledgement.  Notwithstanding the conditions laid out in (2), it should recognize that 
unilateral forgiveness can sometimes be an effective route to reconciliation.  But this still 
leaves the second question which I mentioned at the outset – the question of whether it is 
appropriate for liberal states to promote a civic culture of forgiveness in the absence of an 
agreed account of the rights and wrongs of the past.  Faced with a situation where there is no 
cross-community consensus on who wronged whom, is it fitting for liberal states to exhort 
their citizens to forgiveness?
10
 
Certainly some commentators are sceptical.  Digeser, for example, worries that any 
attempt to cajole citizens into overcoming their feelings of anger and resentment intrudes too 
much into their inner mental lives:  in his view, it constitutes a problematic form of 
‘soulcraft’ (Digeser 2001, p. 17).  Colleen Murphy claims that forgiveness is ill-suited to 
being an object of political concern because it is the subject of so much ethical controversy.  
She remarks that ‘[c]itizens reasonably disagree about the justifiability of forgiving both in 
                                                        
10
 Notwithstanding the shift to the ‘large-scale’, I am, for present purposes, still thinking of forgiveness 
as a stance which one person takes up towards another.  As such, I am remaining agnostic on the question of 
whether governments or states can forgive.     
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general and especially in transitional contexts.  State policies designed to encourage victims 
to forgive fail to acknowledge such disagreement’ (Murphy 2010, p. 13).  In a related vein, 
Marius Schoon, whose wife and daughter were killed by the South African security services 
during the apartheid era, implies that political forgiveness violates the principle of liberal 
neutrality by showing a commitment to a sectarian vision of the good.  In his reflections on 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), he objected ‘bitterly to what 
he call[ed] the “imposition of a Christian morality of forgiveness”’ (quoted in Garton Ash 
1997, pp. 33-37).   
Together these points challenge the appropriateness of any official attempt to foster a 
culture of unilateral (or bilateral) forgiveness.  However, the force of this challenge cannot be 
assessed without at least some inkling of the practical form which such an attempt might 
take.  Although there isn’t a unique formula for promoting forgiveness, there are a number of 
broad-brush strategies that might be adopted.  Perhaps the most explicit of these is to 
incorporate the language of forgiveness into the official discourse of a political community.  
A state, for instance, might recognize forgiveness as a basic constitutional value in much the 
same way that it might recognize freedom, dignity, or reconciliation as basic constitutional 
values.
11
  It might also recommend forgiveness as a policy objective in reports and 
documents addressing the legacy of a particular conflict.
12
  There is also the possibility that it 
might extol the value of forgiveness through the speeches and public statements of officials, 
leaders and civic representatives.
13
 
Besides these overt ways of promoting forgiveness, a more oblique strategy is to set up 
civic or legal institutions which are explicitly focused on dealing with the past and which 
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 To the best of my knowledge, no existing written constitution makes explicit reference to forgiveness.  
The 1994 South African constitution treats ‘national healing’ as a basic value.  
12
 In 2006, the UK government established the Consultative Group on the Past to address the legacy of 
the Troubles in Northern Ireland.  The resulting report placed considerable emphasis on the need for 
forgiveness.  See Consultative Group on the Past (2009), esp. pp. 54-56. 
13
 Famously, Tutu used his position as chair of the TRC to encourage forgiveness.   
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increase the likelihood of interpersonal forgiveness.  At this point, it is worth recalling that 
forgiveness is intermediate in spirit between forgetfulness and vengefulness.  To forgive 
someone involves holding on to a clear-eyed sense that one was wronged whilst discounting 
this perception from one’s practical and emotional orientation towards the perpetrator.  As 
such, the challenge for a state that is pursuing this strategy is to steer a middle course 
between promoting a culture of ‘national amnesia’ and exacerbating the risk of revenge and 
retaliation.
14
  To implement the strategy effectively, the state needs to find an institutional 
structure which gives victims the opportunity to acknowledge and memorialize their past 
suffering whilst also promoting the kind of compassion, empathy and understanding needed 
to blunt the force of hostility, ill will and anger. 
In this context, the South African TRC has an important, if ambiguous, status.  There is 
no doubt that the TRC has often been discussed in terms of forgiveness (see Amstutz 2004, 
pp 201-3; Gutmann and Thompson 2000, pp. 29-33; Kiss 2000, pp. 81-90).  It is also true that 
it catered effectively to the ‘acknowledgement and memorialization’ dimension of 
forgiveness.  Through its public hearings, it gave victims the opportunity to describe their 
experiences of abuse, violence and oppression under apartheid.  During its proceedings, there 
were many powerful and moving testimonials.  However, it was perhaps more problematic in 
catering to the ‘compassion and empathy’ dimension of forgiveness.  Although the TRC 
played host to some remarkable scenes of interpersonal forgiveness, it is questionable 
whether its institutional design was ideally suited to bringing these about.  As Audrey 
Chapman notes (Chapman 2001, p. 270), the TRC had separate committees dealing with 
victims and perpetrators: there was the Human Rights Committee, which took evidence from 
victims, and the Amnesty Committee, which took submissions from perpetrators.  This led to 
a kind of ‘institutional’ separation of victims and perpetrators which wasn’t altogether 
                                                        
14
 Although Tutu has reservations about a policy of ‘national amnesia’, I borrow the phrase from him.  
See Tutu (2000), ch. 2. 
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congenial to promoting the level of sustained interpersonal interaction and dialogue needed 
for victims to become better acquainted with perpetrators, to understand their motives, and to 
empathize with their predicament. 
Perhaps an institution which is better suited to promoting both aspects of forgiveness is 
a (certain kind of) restorative justice conference.  In a typical restorative justice conference, 
there is a sustained face-to-face encounter between the offender and victim – sometimes in 
the presence of family members – where they discuss their respective experiences of the 
offence.
15
  The offender might start by explaining the circumstances and motives which led to 
the crime before the victim describes the impact of the crime on her psychological, physical 
and emotional well-being.  Through this process, both parties might come to adjust their 
attitudes towards one another.  As a result of hearing the victim’s testimony, the perpetrator 
might come to recognize the gravity of the offence and seek to apologize and make amends 
whilst the victim, on hearing the perpetrator’s testimony, might come to see the perpetrator as 
a real human being who ought to be shown a modicum of compassion and acceptance. 
To be sure, there is no guarantee that these changes will happen in every case.  It is a 
matter of empirical controversy just how effective restorative justice conferences are in 
promoting forgiveness.
16
  There is the possibility that such conferences will sometimes serve 
to inflame the victim’s sense of anger and resentment and harden the perpetrator’s sense of 
defiance and alienation.  Nonetheless, restorative justice conferences, and perhaps more 
contestably truth commissions, do provide an important point of reference in considering how 
this ‘institutional’ approach towards forgiveness might be developed.  Even if they have their 
limitations, they exemplify a possible means by which a state might try to increase the 
likelihood of interpersonal forgiveness.  
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 For a helpful discussion of restorative justice and its relation to forgiveness, see Johnstone (2013), pp. 
132-5.  
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 For a sceptical discussion of the empirical effectiveness of restorative justice conferences in promoting 
forgiveness, see Van Stokkom (2008).  
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However, these institutions are importantly different to the institutions that are germane 
to a further approach towards promoting forgiveness.  In the case of both restorative justice 
conferences and truth commissions, there is an obvious focus on the past.  Insofar as a state 
enlists one of these institutions to promote forgiveness, it presumably does so in the belief 
that an official forum in which to discuss past offences can help victims to overcome their 
feelings of resentment and anger.  But a state could take an even more oblique approach 
towards promoting forgiveness.  Instead of establishing institutions which have this 
backwards-looking orientation, it could set up institutions that are firmly focused on the 
present but that promote the kind of compassion, empathy and understanding that may lead to 
less public, less ritualistic scenes of forgiveness. 
The kinds of institutions that I have in mind include cross-community arts projects, 
storytelling initiatives, sports events and social activities.  Particularly in the aftermath of 
civil war or ethnic conflict, one potential source of tension lies in the fact of ongoing 
geographical and social segregation.  Insofar as the two sides tend to live in different areas 
and rarely associate together, there is a risk that pre-existing grievances will be heightened by 
mutual suspicion, misunderstanding, and prejudice.  By creating the opportunities for cross-
community social encounters, a state might therefore hope to counter this risk.  Through the 
establishment of institutions that don’t explicitly focus on past wrongdoing but that 
nonetheless allow victims and perpetrators to come together and to start engaging in ordinary 
social activities, it might hope to promote the kind of sympathetic, humanizing mindset that 
makes private scenes of interpersonal forgiveness more likely.  
Clearly there is much more that needs to be said about this strategy, just as there is 
much more that needs to be said about the other strategies.  Nonetheless, these brief remarks 
about the practicalities of promoting forgiveness do at least permit a more nuanced response 
to some of the concerns mentioned earlier.  In relation to Digeser’s worry about ‘soulcraft’, 
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part of the reply must be concessive: there is no denying that forgiveness could be promoted 
in overly intrusive and coercive ways.  If a state were to prohibit victims from feeling anger 
or suspicion, for example, it would be acting in an absurdly unrealistic and illiberal style, just 
as it would be acting in an absurdly unrealistic and illiberal style if it made an attitude of 
good will mandatory.  But the crucial point to stress here is that a state need not promote 
forgiveness in these ways.  As the foregoing observations make clear, a state could present 
forgiveness as an abstract value or supererogatory ideal, or else it could set up civic 
institutions which increase the likelihood of autonomous expressions of forgiveness.
17
  If it 
were to adopt any such strategy, then the only way in which Digeser’s criticism could be 
sustained would be on the assumption that any official interest in people’s inner mental lives 
is overly intrusive and illiberal. 
Now it so happens that Digeser adopts just such an assumption.  He favours what he 
calls an ‘agency conception of politics’ (Digeser 2001, p. 17).18  He believes that the state 
should focus on the regulation of outward behaviour rather than inner thought and feeling.  
But, whatever the broader merits of this conception of politics, it is not a conception to which 
the liberal state need be committed.
19
  There is a perfectly coherent strand of liberal 
theorizing that emphasizes the need for suitable political virtues.  Rawls, for example, sees a 
role for public education in promoting character-traits such as fairness, reasonableness and a 
willingness to compromise (Rawls 2001, p. 156).  Unless Rawls’s position is condemned as 
illiberal and overly intrusive, it seems hard to see why the non-coercive promotion of 
forgiveness should be condemned as illiberal and overly intrusive.  
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 Here I echo MacLachlan (2012, pp. 48-51), who enlists this point to respond to the ‘illiberalism 
objection’.    
18
 Digeser responds to the ‘soulcraft’ objection by divorcing forgiveness from feelings such as 
resentment and anger and defining it entirely in terms of outward behaviour.  By eschewing a ‘sentiment-based’ 
model of forgiveness, he thinks it is possible to sidestep the objection.  My own view is that it is possible to 
sidestep the objection without even redefining the terms.    
19
 Nor is it a conception of politics which is in evidence in liberal law-making.  By including a ‘mens 
rea’ element in the definition of almost all crimes, liberal states pay some attention to the ‘inner’ aspects of 
human existence.  On this point, see Pettigrove and Parsons (2010), p. 665. 
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Of course, at this point, Murphy’s worry about moral disagreement might be reiterated.  
It might be suggested that forgiveness is especially unsuited to the political realm because its 
ethical value (unlike the ethical value of, say, fairness or reasonableness) is so contested.  
But, on closer inspection, it’s unclear why moral disagreement per se should have this 
implication.  After all, there are plenty of matters – such as abortion, the environment, war, 
genetic engineering, and the treatment of minority cultures – on which citizens reasonably 
disagree and on which liberal states normally take a stand.  Why should forgiveness be an 
area of disagreement which is excluded from the political realm?  
Perhaps what is really troubling Murphy is not so much the fact of moral disagreement 
per se as the fact that, in responding to this disagreement with a pro-forgiveness stance, the 
state is showing sectarian bias.  Understood in this way, Murphy’s objection is much the 
same as Schoon’s: the objection is that forgiveness is ill-suited to the political realm because 
it violates the principle of liberal neutrality.
20
  But this objection, on further inspection, hardly 
seems decisive.  To be sure, there is the possibility that forgiveness will sometimes be 
justified in explicitly sectarian terms.  If a state were to promote forgiveness as a way of 
improving the condition of people’s souls or making them into better Christians, then it 
would be disclosing a commitment to a sectarian conception of the good.  But there is no 
need for a state to justify its interest in forgiveness in these terms.  Given my wider argument, 
it is perfectly possible for a state to defend its interest in forgiveness by citing its causal link 
to the ideal of liberal solidarity: that is to say, it can defend forgiveness as a way of 
establishing the ethos needed for a stable liberal community.  This hardly seems illiberal. 
I am therefore sceptical that there is any general conflict between state-sponsored 
forgiveness and the demands of liberalism.  However, there is an altogether different 
challenge which arises, not from the requirements of liberalism, but from the requirements of 
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 For a discussion of this principle, see Kymlicka (1989) and Kymlicka (2002), pp 217-219.  
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non-partisanship.  In many post-conflict societies, it is important for the state to remain 
neutral between competing assessments of the past.  In Northern Ireland, for example, the 
power-sharing government is only likely to retain cross-community support by avoiding a 
partisan account of the conflict.  Were it to embrace the republican view that the IRA was 
fighting a just war against an illicit colonial occupation, then it would forfeit the support of 
the unionist community, just as it would forfeit the support of much of the nationalist 
community were it to hold that the IRA was a terrorist organization wholly bereft of moral or 
democratic legitimacy.  The difficulty in promoting forgiveness in such circumstances is that 
it seems to be at odds with the requisite kind of moral neutrality.  To promote a civic culture 
of forgiveness, it seems necessary – at least on first inspection – for a state to determine who 
needs to forgive whom, which, in turn, requires classifying people into ‘innocent’ victims and 
‘guilty’ perpetrators, which, in turn, requires making moral judgments about the past.21 
Admittedly, there may be some judgments that a state can make that are sufficiently 
uncontroversial not to risk forfeiting political support.  There may be certain incidents, such 
as war crimes or other serious human rights violations, which are so manifestly egregious that 
no section of the population will take offence at a public declaration of wrongdoing.  But, in 
practice, the number of such uncontested incidents may be relatively small since people often 
disagree on the proper conduct – as well as the justification – of conflict.  In the language of 
just war theory, there is often a debate about the proper application and interpretation of jus 
in bello norms as well as jus ad bellum ones.  In Northern Ireland, for example, there is 
disagreement, not only on whether the IRA was to blame for starting the conflict, but also on 
whether it was right to adopt the targets and tactics that it did. 
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 For a related set of observations, see Griswold (2007), p. 139.  Griswold thinks that the multiplicity of 
different perspectives that exist in the public realm casts doubt on the very idea of ‘public’ or ‘political’ 
forgiveness.  Although I don’t have the time to discuss this point adequately, it is interesting to note that it is 
rooted in the same facts that underpin the charge of partisanship.    
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The strategy of seeking to found a civic culture of forgiveness on a core of uncontested 
judgments may therefore have limited potential in deeply divided societies, and this may, in 
turn, encourage the verdict that forgiveness is unsuited to such conditions: if a society is so 
thoroughly divided about its past that any attempt to construct an official narrative will only 
destabilize a peace process, then it might be argued that it is best for a state to encourage its 
citizens to forget their grievances rather than to forgive them.  Perhaps the best option for 
reconciliation in conditions of unbridgeable moral disagreement is to follow a policy of 
national amnesia rather than national forgiveness. 
But this conclusion seems to me to undersell forgiveness, not least because it ignores an 
altogether different response to the challenge of non-partisanship.  Instead of seeking to 
found a civic culture of forgiveness on a core of uncontested moral judgments, a state might 
seek to promote such a culture without committing itself to any moral judgments at all.  To 
see how this possible, it is instructive to note that the pre-conditions of forgiveness-
promotion are distinct from the preconditions of forgiveness itself.  Whilst forgiveness 
requires a belief on the part of the forgiver that a wrong has been done, forgiveness-
promotion only requires a belief on the part of the promoter that those who are being 
encouraged to forgive believe a wrong has been done. 
Once this is noted, then it becomes possible to see how a state can encourage 
forgiveness whilst remaining non-committal about the rights and wrongs of the past.  The 
crucial point to emphasize here is that a state can devolve the relevant moral decision-making 
to its citizens.  Instead of seeking to construct an ‘official’ list of victims and wrongdoers, it 
can start from the fact that each citizen may have their own personal assessment of who 
qualifies as a victim and who qualifies as a wrongdoer.  It can then hold that anyone who self-
identifies as a victim by the lights of their own personal narrative should forgive their 
perceived assailant.  So long as the state doesn’t endorse the individual’s narrative but simply 
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takes it to be a psychological or sociological datum that needs to be factored into its 
policymaking, then it can avoid making any moral judgments about the past at all.   
Of course this does raise a further question about the practicalities of such a strategy.  A 
state that is determined to remain loftily non-committal about the rights and wrongs of the 
past cannot take initiatives that classify some people as official victims and other people as 
official wrongdoers.  In this respect, the creation of South African-style truth commissions or 
restorative justice conferences may be out of the question, at least insofar as they presuppose 
the allocation of such roles.  But it doesn’t follow from this that a non-partisan state can do 
nothing concrete to foster a civic culture of forgiveness.  Rather than adopting the second 
strategy that I mentioned earlier, it could adopt the third and final strategy instead.  It could 
establish institutions which don’t logically presuppose any prior ascription of wrongdoing but 
which nonetheless promote the kind of compassion and empathy which increases the 
likelihood of private scenes of interpersonal forgiveness.  For example, it could set up cross-
community arts and social projects as a way of bringing people together and promoting 
greater dialogue and respect, or else it might set up ‘storytelling initiatives’ as a way of 
allowing former combatants to exchange experiences and come to a more sympathetic 
understanding of each other’s motives.  There is no reason to think that such measures 
require the state to take one side’s point of view more seriously than the other’s.22 
These measures, moreover, have a virtue that a policy of ‘national amnesia’ lacks.  
Notwithstanding their non-partisanship, they show willingness on the part of the state to take 
seriously the different narratives that exist within a divided society.  This is because a 
strategy of forgiveness-promotion seeks to effect a change in people’s attitudes but not a 
change in their underlying moral beliefs.  It tries to get people to overcome their resentment, 
                                                        
22
 In recommending this strategy, my position bears some comparison with the approach recommended 
in Smith (2012), pp. 48-51.  However, Smith tends to see this as a non-political, ‘bottom up’ approach which 
emerges from the grass roots initiatives of private individuals whereas I see it as an approach that can be 
orchestrated by the state.       
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hostility and mistrust whilst allowing them to maintain their conviction that they were 
wronged.  It is therefore consistent with recognizing that a person’s sense of the past – 
including their sense of individual or collective victimhood – may constitute an important 
part of their cultural and political identity which should not be suppressed or buried.  In a 
very real sense, it respects and accommodates the fact of moral disagreement.   
  
Conclusion    
In summary, the moral dynamics which typically prevail in the aftermath of periods of civil 
war and mass violence don’t constitute a decisive challenge to a strategy of forgiveness-
promotion.  The fact that different people may disagree about who is to blame for what, and 
who needs to ask for forgiveness from whom, doesn’t imply that such a strategy will be 
ineffective as a route to reconciliation, nor does it mean that it will violate the demands of 
liberalism or non-partisanship.  Together these points add up to a prospectus on the role of 
forgiveness in politics which owes part of its interest to the relation that it bears to the main 
alternative.  Those who espouse the Repentance Thesis don’t necessarily deny that 
forgiveness can be relevant in divided societies but they typically insist that it needs to be 
embedded in a broader attempt to construct a shared assessment of the conflict: it is only by 
getting the different factions to see eye-to-eye on who qualifies as a victim and who qualifies 
as a wrongdoer that they believe that forgiveness can be enlisted as an effective way of 
promoting the ethos of liberal solidarity.
23
 
                                                        
23
 This kind of view finds expression, for example, in Consultative Group on the Past (2009).  This report 
is unambiguous in its rejection of unilateral forgiveness, insisting that ‘[i]t is simply not possible to complete an 
act of forgiveness unless a wrong is acknowledged’ (Consultative Group on the Past 2009, p. 54).  Instead it 
places considerable faith in the capacity of the different communities to reach a consensus on the past through a 
process of dialogue and truth-recovery, stating that, ‘[a]s cross-community story-telling and other forms of 
memorialisation proceed, it is quite possible the overall futility of recourse to arms to solve the problems of a 
divided Northern Ireland might begin to dawn on those who took part’ (Consultative Group on the Past 2009, p. 
55). 
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In a sense, the stimulus for my argument is the observation that this kind of agreement 
is sometimes unobtainable.  Regardless of its desirability, there are plenty of situations where 
no amount of dialogue or political encouragement will lead to a complete consensus on the 
moral complexion of the conflict.  In Northern Ireland, for instance, in spite of some notable 
examples of contrition,
24
 the different sections of the community continue to disagree 
passionately about the defining questions of recent history, including the question of whether 
the Provisional IRA was right to take up arms against the British state in the late 1960s.
25
   To 
endorse the Repentance Thesis is therefore tantamount to excluding forgiveness as a way of 
dealing with the legacies of the past in many situations where the need for reconciliation is 
most acute.  
My proposal, by contrast, allows that forgiveness can have political value in conditions 
of persistent and unbridgeable moral disagreement.  It implies that a state that is trying to 
promote reconciliation shouldn’t discount a strategy of forgiveness-promotion just because 
there is no prospect of securing agreement on the rights and wrongs of a conflict.  But it 
doesn’t follow from this that such strategy should be adopted in every conceivable post-
conflict scenario.  In this context, it is worth reiterating my earlier point that there are 
constraints on an adequate forgiveness-based reconciliation.  From an institutional 
perspective, these constraints have an important bearing on the way in which such a strategy 
is framed.  They imply that a state seeking to promote a civic culture of forgiveness should at 
the same time seek to ensure that the conditions set out in principle (2) are satisfied.  
Although such a state shouldn’t be fixated on constructing a shared assessment of the 
conflict, it should – as far as possible – try to ensure that its citizens are committed to 
exclusively democratic, non-violent means going into the future and aren’t so intolerant of 
                                                        
24
 The Provisional IRA, for example, issued an apology to all of its ‘non-combatant’ victims in 2002.   
25
 I therefore agree with Biggar (2008), p. 568, that ‘[i]f there is to be any measure of reconciliation in 
Northern Ireland, it will be the reconciliation of partisans.  Reconciliation will have to happen between those 
who continue to disagree about what caused the Troubles and about who is basically to blame for them.’   
 34 
different judgments about the past that any offer of forgiveness is taken as an insult.  By 
cultivating the right kinds of attitude towards the future and towards the fact of moral 
disagreement, it can have greater confidence that unilateral forgiveness will be an effective 
means of promoting reconciliation. 
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